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CONSTITUTION AND CAUSAL ROLES
Lorenzo Casini† and Michael Baumgartner‡
Alexander Gebharter has recently proposed to use Bayesian network causal
discovery methods to identify the constitutive dependencies that underwrite5
mechanistic explanations. The proposal depends on using the assumptions of
the causal Bayesian network framework to implicitly define mechanistic con-
stitution as a kind of deterministic direct causal dependence. The aim of this
paper is twofold. In the first half, we argue that Gebharter’s proposal incurs
severe conceptual problems. In the second half, we present an alternative way10
to bring Bayesian network tools to bear on the issue of understanding mecha-
nistic constitution. More precisely, our proposal interprets constitution as the
relation explaining why a target phenomenon has its characteristic causal role
in terms of the causal roles of some of its spatiotemporal parts—where the
notion of causal role is probabilistically understood.15
1 INTRODUCTION
The mechanistic account of scientific explanation (Machamer et al., 2000;
Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Glennan, 2002) holds that the explanandum, a
higher-level phenomenon, is explained by the lower-level mechanism respon-
sible for it. In a popular characterization,20
[a] mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its com-
ponent parts, component operations, and their organization. The or-
chestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more
phenomena. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, 423)
To make a simple but paradigmatic example, the phenomenon of amplification25
in a two-stage amplifier is caused by a signal (e.g., current, voltage, power) re-
ceived from an input source, and it causes in turn outer effects such as signal
distortion, as produced by an output device (e.g., a loudspeaker). The phe-
nomenon is explained by the augmentation of the signal by the two transistors
of the amplifier arranged in series (see Wimsatt 2007, ch. 12). Another, often-30
cited example is the phenomenon of action potential in a neuron, namely the
sudden rise and fall in the electric potential of a neuron’s membrane. The
phenomenon is caused by the binding of neurotransmitters, which are released
by a neighbouring, “presynaptic” neuron, to receptors of the “postsynaptic”
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neuron, and it causes in turn the release of neurotransmitters into the synaptic35
cleft. The phenomenon is explained by the activities of many components,
most importantly by the opening and closing of voltage-gated ion channels in
the neuron’s membrane (see Craver 2007, chs. 2 and 4).
More generally, a mechanism is embedded in a causal context, where
causal background conditions are operative that provide the external circum-40
stances relative to which certain parts of the system are responsible for the
phenomenon. The relevant kind of responsibility is constitutive rather than
causal. The system’s parts that mechanistically explain the phenomenon are
the “component” (see above quote), or constituent, parts. The importance of
the notion of constitutive relevance, or constitution, in mechanistic accounts45
of explanation is emphasized by Craver, who maintains that “the very idea of
a mechanism presupposes the idea of constitutive relevance” (Craver, 2007,
8). While causation has been at the centre of philosophical theorizing for cen-
turies, the notion of constitution has only recently begun to attract philosoph-
ical attention. In particular, it is still unclear what discovery method would50
systematize the inference to constitution.
Gebharter has recently (2017b) suggested drawing on the resources of the
Bayesian network (BN) framework, which is widely used to model causa-
tion (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2000), to address the task of constitutional
discovery. He has claimed that, despite the differences between causation and55
constitution, the BN axioms used to model causal relations also capture consti-
tutive relations, and that constitution can be implicitly characterized as a form
of direct deterministic causation—from which he infers that one may concur-
rently use BN causal discovery algorithms for both causal and constitutional
discovery.60
In the first part of this paper, we argue that Gebharter’s intended use of BNs
incurs severe conceptual problems. In paradigmatic cases, allowing determin-
istic dependencies entails violations of a standard assumption (viz. Faithful-
ness) of BN constraint-based algorithms (in particular, PC), which Gebharter
proposes to exploit for constitutional discovery, leading to systematic mis-65
takes in causal and constitutional inference. In the second part of the paper,
we propose a theory of constitution, which avoids these problems. In a nut-
shell, our proposal is that the constituents are all and only those parts of a
phenomenon, whose causal roles account for why the phenomenon has its
characteristic causal role. This idea has been recently expressed, in one way70
or another, by a number of authors (e.g., Gillett 2002, 3191; see also Fazekas
and Kerte´sz 2011 and Soom 20122) but it has never been cashed out in detail
1Gillett (2002) proposes an account of “realization” as a relation between the causal powers
individuating a phenomenon and those individuating its constituents.
2The latter, contrary to the former, maintain that the causal role of the phenomenon is iden-
tical to (rather than supervenient on) the causal role of its constituents. We do not endorse this
assumption.
CONSTITUTION AND CAUSAL ROLES 3
and with formal precision. We fill this gap by giving it a precise rendering in
the framework of BNs, which is particularly suitable to explicate the notion of
causal roles that figures in our account. In sum, the intended contribution of75
our proposal is to provide an operational definition of constitution that brings
a sophisticated machinery for causal discovery, viz. BNs, to bear on the task
of constitutional discovery in a theoretically sound way.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief introduction to causal BNs
(§2), we review Gebharter’s proposal and find it flawed (§3). As an alternative,80
we spell out our theory, sketch its operationalization, and discuss how it avoids
the discovery problems incurred by Gebharter’s proposal (§4).
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let us begin by introducing the theory of causal BNs, as well as a notational
convention on the variables of BNs representing mechanistic systems.85
Traditionally, the BN formalism uses generic random variables, to repre-
sent types (or degrees) of properties or behaviours independently of the enti-
ties instantiating them. Here, however, we shall follow the mechanistic liter-
ature in taking the variables as denoting the behaviours exhibited by specific
entities (such as a system and its constituents), and consequently adopt the90
following notational convention. We shall use calligraphic fonts to introduce
specific random variables A(S) and B(P1) (Spohn, 2006), by which we de-
note the behaviour A of a specific system S and the behaviour B of a specific
part P1. As we are only concerned with specific variables, we will leave the
entity-relativity of our variables implicit and just write “A”, “B”, etc. for the95
behaviour types “A(S)”, “B(P1)”, etc. This relativization to specific systems
and their parts entails that mechanistic phenomena are not multiply realized
by different types of systems (e.g., amplification as realized by a two-stage se-
rial amplifier and amplification as realized by a parallel amplifier are different
phenomena), albeit they may be multiply realized by multiple configurations100
of the values of the parts of systems of the same type (e.g., action potentials
in the same neuron are overdetermined by multiple configurations of its ion
channels’ states, which are jointly sufficient but not individually necessary to
action potential).
A BN is a triple ⟨V, E, Pr⟩ of: a finite set V = {V1, . . . ,Vn} of variables,105
each taking finitely many possible values; a set of edges E, whose connected
nodes are the variables inV, such that nodes and edges form a directed acyclic
graph (DAG); and a probability distribution Pr, such that the probability of
each variable Vi in the DAG obeys the Markov Condition (MC):
(MC) For any Vi ∈V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}, Vi⊥Noni ∣ Pari ,110
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Figure 1: A Bayesian network
where Pari denotes the set of parents of Vi, and Noni denotes the set of non-
descendants of Vi.3 In words, each variable is probabilistically independent of
its non-descendants, conditional on its parents. For instance, MC applied to
the DAG in Figure 1 implies that V4 ⊥ {V1,V5}∣{V2,V3}. In BN jargon, V2
and V3 “screen off” V4 from V1 and V5.115
When the BN is causally interpreted, no pair of variables denotes proper-
ties in semantic, logical or mereological relations. In that case, the edges stand
for direct causal relations, and MC is called Causal Markov Condition (CMC)
(cf. Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.4.1, §3.5.1).
A precondition for a variable set to satisfy CMC is (causal) Sufficiency120
(Zhang 2006, 8; cf. Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.2.2):
(Sufficiency) ⟨V, E, Pr⟩ is such that every direct common cause of any two
variables in V is in V, or has the same value for all units in the popula-
tion.
Sufficiency is meant to guarantee that for any two variables in V, there is no125
probabilistic dependence not due to a causal dependence—that is, no proba-
bilistic dependence is spurious. The condition entails that, while there may be
latent causes of modelled variables, there are no latent common causes of any
two modelled variables.
Finally, Faithfulness is standardly assumed in the causal BN literature130
(Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.4.3), especially for purposes of causal discovery:
(Faithfulness) ⟨V, E, Pr⟩ is such that every conditional independence rela-
tion true in Pr is entailed by CMC applied to ⟨V, E⟩.
Faithfulness guarantees that there is no causal dependence without probabilis-
tic dependence—or, in other words, that the only probabilistic independencies135
in the graph are due to the absence of corresponding causal dependencies.
For instance, the causal Faithfulness condition applied to the BN in Figure
1 implies that V4 /⊥ V2, that is, there is no exact cancellation of V2’s effect
3The “parents” of Vi are the direct ancestors of Vi, namely those vertices on directed paths
into Vi from which Vi can be reached without mediation via other vertices. The “descendants”
of Vi are those vertices, which may be reached from Vi along a directed path.
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on V4 due to, say, a positive influence along the direct path V2 Ð→ V4 and a
negative influence along the indirect path V2 Ð→ V3 Ð→ V4. In particular,140
Faithfulness entails that all causal dependencies are detectable by conditional
independence tests, as commonly performed by causal discovery algorithms
(see, e.g.: Spirtes et al. 2000, 82, 88, 144; and Pearl 2000, 50, 52).
3 SHORTCOMINGS OF GEBHARTER’S PROPOSAL
While BNs have a long tradition of successful applications in causal discovery,145
they have played no role so far in constitutional discovery. The main reason is
that constitution is commonly assumed to be characterized by (non-reductive)
supervenience (see, e.g., Glennan 1996, 61-2, and Eronen 2011, ch. 11), which
gives rise to deterministic dependencies: a complete set of constituents of a
phenomenon forms a supervenience base of that phenomenon, and thus a suf-150
ficient condition for it—i.e., necessarily, there is no change in the phenomenon
without a change in its supervenience base (but not vice versa). This sharply
distinguishes constitution from causation, which in the BN framework is as-
sumed to be non-deterministic, or “pseudoindeterministic” (cf. Spirtes et al.
2000, §3.3.2), due to latent, unmeasured causes.155
To illustrate the difference, let us consider the amplification mechanism.
Let G indicate the phenomenon of gain, or total voltage increase, of an ampli-
fier subject to a voltage input I. Amplifiers are built by assembling a number
of active elements, usually transistors, in a circuit. Assume that the amplifier
in question is a two-stage amplifier, such that the signal received by a first160
transistor is amplified and fed to a second transistor, which further amplifies
it. Let A and B be the transistors’ individual gains.
Then, the amplifier’s overall gain in response to any given input I = i is
some pseudoindeterministic function G = rGi − i + G , where rG indicates
a (constant) amplification ratio and G indicates some noise. For instance, if165 I = 2 volts and the amplification ratio is 8, then G = 2×8 − 2 + G volts, where
14 (i.e., 2 × 8 − 2) volts and G volts, respectively, are G’s deterministic and
non-deterministic components. Analogously, the transistors’ absolute gains
are given byA = rAi − i + A volts andB = rBi − i + B volts. The composition
function determining the overall amplification ratio of a serial amplifier is the170
product of its transistors’ amplification ratios. Assume that the first transistor
amplifies by a ratio 2, and the second amplifies by a ratio 4, such that the
overall ratio is 8. Then, when subject to an input I = 2 volts, the first transistor
amplifies the signal by 2× 2 − 2 + A volts; and the second transistor receives
that signal and amplifies it further by 4 × (4 + A) − (4 + A) + B volts.175
By contrast, the relation between G on the one hand, and A and B on the
other hand, is not pseudoindeterministic but deterministic: A and B determineG. This means that, whatever noisy component is present in G, this is inher-
ited from, and fully accounted for by, the noise in A and B. More precisely,
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supervenience entails that rGi − i + G = rB(rAi + A) − i + B. When I = 2180
volts, 2 × 8 − 2 + G = 4 × (4 + A) − 2 + B, that is, G = 4A + B.
The deterministic dependencies entailed by supervenience, in turn, tend
to induce violations of one of the standard assumptions of BN discovery al-
gorithms, viz. Faithfulness (Spirtes et al. 2000, §3.8; Glymour 2007, 236).
Nonetheless, Gebharter (2017b) has recently contended that these algorithms185
can be directly applied, with some restrictions, to variable sets featuring both
constitutional and causal relations, such that the uncovered dependencies are
then grouped into causal and constitutional dependencies using information
about temporal overlap. As a result, so Gebharter claims, BN algorithms can
be used to perform causal and constitutional discovery in one go.190
Even though Gebharter is not concerned with explicitly defining constitu-
tive relevance, he still argues (2017b, 2652–54) that constitution is implicitly
characterized by the same axioms that the BN framework assumes for causa-
tion. More specifically, he claims that the screening-off behaviour of complete
sets of constituents is analogous to that of deterministic direct causes and that195
the screening-off behaviour of incomplete sets is analogous to that of indeter-
ministic direct causes (2653). From that, he infers that constitutional relations
can be represented by BNs and uncovered by standard BN algorithms, just like
causal relations.
However, in light of the failure of Faithfulness in the presence of determin-200
istic dependencies, the apparent conclusion to draw from Gebharter’s finding
that constitutive relations behave like deterministic causation would be that
BNs are not capable of representing systems featuring constitutive relations
(in addition to indeterministic causal relations), just as they are not capable
of representing systems featuring deterministic causal relations, and that—a205
fortiori—BN algorithms are not applicable to systems featuring constitutive
relations. Gebharter attempts to diffuse these worries by introducing restric-
tions on the applicability of his approach.
More specifically, he suggests (2017b, 2662) that violations of Faithful-
ness induced by deterministic constitutive relations can be avoided if the ap-210
plication of BN algorithms is restricted to mechanistic systems with two lev-
els only. This amounts to using background knowledge on parthood relations
between variable instances to only include parts of the phenomenon in the
analysed variable set but not parts of parts of it. To illustrate, consider a
mechanistic system with three levels, where V1 constitutively determines V2,215
which constitutively determines a phenomenon V3. In that case, it holds that
Pr(V3 ∣V1 ∧ V2) = Pr(V3 ∣V1) = 1, viz. that the indirect constituent V1 screens
off V3 from its direct constituent V2, which, however, is not entailed by CMC
and hence violates Faithfulness. That is, mechanistic hierarchies with consti-
tutive paths tend to violate Faithfulness. Without argument, Gebharter then220
assumes that these chainlike structures are the only type of mechanistic sys-
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Figure 2: Structure of a two-stage amplifier mechanism, for an epiphenomenalist*.
tems that induce failures of Faithfulness due to deterministic dependencies,
and recommends that BN methods be applied to two-level mechanisms only.
Yet, Gebarther severely underestimates the problems induced by his pro-
posal. First, note that, by the assumed supervenience of phenomena on their225
constituents, every phenomenon has a complete set of constituents that de-
termine it and, as a result of determination, screen it off from all other vari-
ables. It follows that a complete graph (involving any number of levels) of
any mechanistic system will not feature edges in and out of phenomena. A
friend of macro-level causation will interpret this finding as yet another Faith-230
fulness violation induced by deterministic dependencies. On the assumption
that phenomena can be caused and be causally efficacious, the screening-off
relations in complete graphs of mechanistic systems exceed those entailed by
CMC applied to the true graphs of these systems. What is more, this breach
of Faithfulness obtains even in two-level systems, as may be illustrated by our235
amplification example (Figure 2). Let the variable set beV′ = {I,G,S,A,B},
where S denotes a side-effect of the mechanism, namely the distortion of the
signal as received by an output device, say, a loudspeaker. Given superve-
nience, {I,S} ⊥ G ∣ {A,B}.
Opponents of macro-level causation can avoid this consequence. They240
interpret the fact that phenomena are screened off from all incoming and out-
going influences by their constituents as an argument in favour of a radical
form of macro-level epiphenomenalism, call it epiphenomenalism*, viz. the
view that non-fundamental properties are not only causally inert (as entailed
by standard epiphenomenalism) but also uncaused. Against that background,245
the absence of arrows in and out of phenomena in complete mechanistic graphs
is entailed by CMC and, hence, does not violate Faithfulness. Accordingly, to
maintain his claim that two-level systems do not violate Faithfulness, Gebhar-
ter endorses epiphenomenalism* (cf. Gebharter, 2017a).4 Plainly though, this
consequence does not sit well with the intentions of most mechanists. While250
4Gebharter insists (2017b, 2660) that macro variables may still be involved in “inefficient”
(or “unproductive”) causal relations, that is, causal relations that do not manifest themselves
in difference-making patterns. Hence, Gebharter’s endorses epiphenomenalism* with respect
to efficient causation only. But his motivation for admitting inefficient relations in a formalism
that takes difference making to be necessary for causation is unclear. For instance, it is unclear
whether admitting inefficient relations delivers an advantage that outweighs their undetectabil-
ity by standard BN methods and thus their indistinguishability from spurious correlations.
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Figure 3: Graph over V′ = {I,G,S,A,B} inferred by PC.
there is a longstanding debate among philosophers on whether the notion
of causation is dispensable in physics (Russell, 1913; Norton, 2003; Frisch,
2012), it is much less controversial to assume that causation is indispensable
in other domains, such as the social and biomedical sciences, which routinely
engage in testing and using causal claims. A characterization of constitution255
that is a priori incompatible with higher-level causation is at best undesirable.
All the more so if macro relations pass the usual BN tests for causation in
variable sets without variables in parthood relations with one another—tests
the validity of which Gebharter does not dispute.
What is worse, allowing deterministic dependencies in BNs generates fur-260
ther problems, which—contrary to epiphenomenalism*—Gebharter cannot
possibly accept. A first problem is that, in two-level systems, not only phe-
nomena are screened off from all incoming and outgoing influences, but also
constituents can be screened off in this way. To see this, reconsider the ampli-
fication example (Figure 3). G is an additive function of its constituentsA and265 B. Hence, not only G is screened off from I and S (by A and B). Since G andA determine B (e.g., G =14 ∧ A=2 determines B=12), also B is screened off
from I and S. Analogously, since G and B determine A (e.g., G=14 ∧ B=12
determines A=2), also A is screened off from I and S. If the graph in Figure
2 truly represents the underlying structure, these further conditional indepen-270
dencies are not entailed by CMC and, hence, violate Faithfulness. To avoid
this consequence, Gebharter not only has to endorse the absence of causal in-
fluences in and out of G but also the absence of causal influences in and out ofA and B.
The presence of such conditional independencies is not limited to the case275
of additive composition functions, as may be illustrated with reference to one
of Gebharter’s own examples. Consider the phenomenon of bidding in an
auction, W , as constituted by raising either the left hand L or the right handR, viz. W =1 ↔ (L=1 ∧ R=0) ∨ (L=0 ∧ R=1). Gebharter observes thatL and R are unconditionally independent (i.e., L ⊥ R), as they are caused280
by the bidder’s free decision—call thisD—but become dependent conditional
on W (i.e., L /⊥ R ∣W). From this, he concludes that “constitutive relations
[...] seem to behave exactly like they were direct causal relations” (2654) in
a collider structure. However, Gebharter misses an important disanalogy. IfL and R caused (pseudoindeterministically) W , then W and R would not285
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determine L, such that L /⊥ D ∣ {W,R}, nor would W and L determine R,
such that R /⊥ D ∣ {W,L}. By contrast, in the constitutive case, not onlyL and R determine W , such that W ⊥ D ∣ {L,R}; in addition, W and R
determine L,5 such that L ⊥ D ∣ {W,R}, and W and L determine R, such
that R ⊥ D ∣ {W,L}—again to the effect that not only the phenomenon but290
also its constituents are screened off from all non-constituents.
In sum, to maintain his claim that Faithfulness can safely be assumed for
mechanistic systems with no more than two levels, Gebharter would have to
contend that ever so many common mechanistic systems are causally iso-
lated from the rest of the universe. He cannot plausibly accept this conse-295
quence, which in turn yields that the above screening-off relations must be
interpreted to violate Faithfulness. All of this shows that restricting Gebhar-
ter’s approach to two-level systems does not ensure that Faithfulness reliably
holds for BNs featuring both causal and constitutive dependencies. In such
cases, standard BN algorithms will erroneously conclude that mechanisms are300
isolated from their environment. In particular, Gebharter proposes to use a spe-
cific constraint-based algorithm, viz. PC (Spirtes et al., 2000, 84). PC infers to
causation only from adjacencies, that is, from conditional dependencies. In the
above cases, PC would remove all adjacencies between constituents and non-
constituents, and thus find no causal relations between them (see again Figure305
3).6 That is, PC may lead to mistaken inferences when applied to mixed sets
of causal and constitutive dependencies.
In response to this objection, one might qualify the proposal by main-
taining that Gebharter’s method is only guaranteed to work when applied to
phenomena, which are multiply-realized even relative to specific systems—310
viz. phenomena, whose values are overdetermined by multiple configurations
of values of their parts. Phenomena like amplification are not so overdeter-
mined: conditional on the value of the phenomenon and all but one con-
stituents, the value of the remaining constituent is determined. As a result,
both the phenomenon and the constituents are conditionally independent of315
non-constituents, such that Faithfulness is violated. By contrast, when a phe-
nomenon is overdetermined, the constituents necessarily determine the phe-
nomenon, but for any constituent, the phenomenon and all other constituents
need not determine that one constituent. As a result, the phenomenon is inde-
pendent of non-constituents conditional on all constituents, in line with Geb-320
harter’s epiphenomenalism*, whereas constituents are not independent of non-
constituents, conditional on the phenomenon and all other constituents, such
5In fact, any of the four possible value configurations of W and L suffice to fix the value
of R: W = 0 ∧ R = 0 → L = 1; W = 0 ∧ R = 1 → L = 0; W = 1 ∧ R = 0 → L = 1; andW =1 ∧ R=1→ L=0. (The same point applies to W and R determining L.)
6Gebharter fails to see this. He implicitly assumes that, no matter the details of the com-
position function relating phenomena to their constituents, PC will find dependencies between
constituents and non-constituents (see 2017b, 2656, Figure 2, step 3). As our argument shows,
this assumption is not always justified.
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Figure 4: An epiphenomenalist* model of the action potential mechanism.
that Faithfulness is satisfied. To illustrate, one may consider a modified ver-
sion of the bidding example, where raising at least one between the left hand
and the right hand constitutes bidding, viz. W ↔ L ∨R. Since W is overde-325
termined by L and R, the bidder’s free decision to raise a hand, D, becomes
independent ofW conditional on L andR, whereas it remains dependent of L
(resp. R) conditional on W and R (resp. L), such that the D–L (resp. D–R)
adjacency is not removed. Hence, Gebharter’s method would correctly anal-
yse this revised bidding example, if its applicability were further restricted to330
phenomena that are overdetermined by multiple sets of constituents.
Clearly though, a thus restricted discovery procedure would hinge on a
distinction between redundantly constituted phenomena and non-redundantly
constituted phenomena and, in consequence, would be doomed from the start
because it would presuppose knowledge of constitution. But not even if that335
circularity threat could somehow be avoided, would the restriction to overde-
termined phenomena yield an adequate method, because in other cases it leads
to another kind of Faithfulness violation.
To illustrate, consider the example of action potential. The mechanism
works roughly as follows. Local changes in the electric potential of the neu-340
ron’s membrane cause the opening/closing of ion channels, and a flow of ions
through the membrane; in turn, variations in ion concentrations between the
inside and the outside of the membrane determine changes in electric poten-
tial of neighbouring portions of the membrane, causing further channels to
open/close; and so on. In particular, the mechanism is initiated when sodium345
ions flow into the neuron’s body and bring the membrane’s potential over a
threshold, which triggers a spike along the neuron’s axon. The mechanism
terminates when, upon depolarization of the membranes of the neuron’s ter-
minals, calcium ions flow into the terminals and bind to vesicles filled with
neurotransmitters, causing them to travel to the membrane’s surface, such that350
neurotransmitters are released into the synaptic cleft.
Figure 4 provides a simplified model of the mechanism. Let us de-
note the action potential phenomenon by P . Let us denote the cause of
the mechanism—neurotransmitters binding to the membrane of the neuron’s
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Figure 5: Graph over V′′ = {O,P,E ,X1, . . . ,Xn,T1,T2} inferred by PC.
body—by O, and its effect—neurotransmitters being released by the axon355
terminals—by E . Let us assume that O is the only exogenous cause of the
mechanism. In particular, the mechanism operates against a fixed background,
where subject to a suitable difference in potential, ions flow through the mem-
brane whenever the channels open, such that ion concentrations are not in-
dependent, exogenous causes of the mechanism. To model the mechanism,360
let us further denote by Xi the opening of sodium channels in the i-th sec-
tion of the axon’s membrane, where i ranges from 1 (closest to the hillock)
to n (closest to the terminals). To account for the fact that action potential is
multiply realized, in the sense that it may obtain irrespective of whether all of
the ion channels open, let us assume that, in different halves of the terminals,365
T1 and T2, neurotransmitters are released with different probabilities, because
calcium channels are differently distributed on their membranes, such that dif-
ferent amounts of calcium ions flow into T1 and T2 and, as a result, different
amounts of vesicles filled with neurotransmitters travel to the surface of T1
and T2. We use two distinct variables, T1 and T2, to represent the opening370
of ion channels in T1 and T2. Finally, let us stipulate that, as long as T1 orT2 are in their open state, an action potential is completed. This satisfies the
further condition that the phenomenon be multiply realized, because a set of
constituents including T1 and T2 redundantly determines, or overdetermines,P .375
Against this backdrop, an algorithm such as PC would infer that P is inde-
pendent ofO and E conditional on T1 and T2 (Figure 5). By contrast, P and T1
(resp. T2) do not determine T2 (resp. T1), such that T1 (resp. T2) is not indepen-
dent ofO and E , in line with Gebharter’s epiphenomenalism*. Here, however,
the problem arises that the last two elements of the bottom-level causal path,380 T1 and T2, make any of their ancestors along the causal path X1 Ð→ ⋯Ð→ Xn
redundant to determine P , and thus to screen P off from O and E . In other
words, no state of X1, . . . ,Xn accounts for changes in P that are not already
accounted for by the states of T1 and T2. Consequently, tests of conditional
independence, as performed by causal discovery algorithms such as PC, will385
find no adjacencies between P and X1, . . . ,Xn. Why is this a problem?
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Theories of constitution and methods for constitutive discovery rest on
a criterion for distinguishing between constitutive and non-constitutive rela-
tions. Gebharter’s (2017b, 2653) characterization of constitution as a kind
of direct deterministic dependence—which, to recall, was meant to avoid390
Faithfulness violations due to constitutive paths over more than two levels—
commits him to the view that, when Sufficiency is satisfied, only constituents
are adjacent to the phenomenon; any variable that is screened off from it is
a non-constituent. In particular, this entails that the behaviours of parts and
wholes stand in a constitutive relation only if they are adjacent. When they are395
not adjacent, they are not constitutively related.7 In this respect, Gebharter’s
proposal (implicitly) entails that causal and constitutive dependencies are dif-
ferent in that variables on directed causal paths are causes of their descendants
even if they are not adjacent to them, whereas variables on directed causal-
or-constitutive paths are not constituents of their descendants unless they are400
adjacent to them. The problem with this assumption is that it is intuitively
false. Some phenomena (e.g., G) are adjacent to all of their constituents, as
they would not be determined by any proper subset of them (only A, or onlyB). But not all phenomena are like this. For instance, P is adjacent to T1 andT2 but not to X1, . . . ,Xn, as only the former but not the latter are necessary to405
determineP . Yet, intuitively all such activities are constitutive of action poten-
tial, as they allow the signal to propagate from the body to the axon terminals,
notwithstanding the fact that not all produce conditional dependencies, such
that the distribution is unfaithful to the structure in Figure 4. To generalize,
Gebharter’s attempt to avoid Faithfulness violations in constitutive paths by410
imposing that, in two-level variable sets, constitutive dependencies are direct
immediately generates further Faithfulness violations: when a phenomenon is
redundantly constituted by paths of activities, some constituents are not ad-
jacent to it. In those cases, Gebharter’s proposed procedure systematically
mistakes constituents for non-constituents.415
In response to the aforementioned problems, one may be tempted to re-
ply that the principle of Gebharter’s proposal can be saved, provided one does
not employ the traditional PC algorithm, but a version of PC that accounts for
Faithfulness violations due to deterministic dependencies, viz. PCD, as pro-
posed for instance by Glymour (2007).8 In a nutshell, PCD differs from PC420
in that it removes an adjacency between two variables Vi and Vj only if nei-
ther one can only be made independent of the other by conditionalizing on a
subset of variables (excluding Vi and Vj) that brings its probability up to 1.
For instance, in the amplification example, PCD would not remove the I–A
adjacency, because I and A can only be made independent by conditional-425
izing on the subset {G,B}, but Pr(A ∣G,B) = 1. Analogously, in the action
7To wit, in Gebharter’s (2017b) fictional example (Figure 1, 2650), X4, which is a part of
X9 but not a constituent of X9, is not adjacent to X9.
8Gebharter indeed recommends using PCD in these cases (personal communication).
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Figure 6: Graph over V′ = {I,G,S,A,B} inferred by PCD.
potential example, PCD would not remove the X1–P adjacency based on the
conditional independence X1 ⊥ P ∣ {T1,T2}, because Pr(P ∣T1,T2) = 1.
Here, however, the problem arises that other adjacencies may erroneously
be removed, as may be illustrated by reference to the amplification case. Even430
if S is a (non-determininistic) function of I, A, and B, it can be reduced
to a function of I and G only, simply because A and B determine G. As
a consequence, it holds that Pr(S ∣I,G) = Pr(S ∣I,G,A) = Pr(S ∣I,G,B),
meaning that I and G suffice to makeA and B independent of S , and bring the
probability of neither S nor A or B up to 1. Thus, PCD will remove A–S and435 B–S (Figure 6). In contrast, I, A, and B make G independent of S but bring
the probability of G up to 1. Thus, PCD will not remove G–S. In this case,
not only is G not disconnected from the output of the mechanism, S . What
is more, the constituents A and B, which according to Gebharter ought to
do all the causal work, are actually made irrelevant by the phenomenon they440
constitute, namely G.9 But clearly, they are not irrelevant. By assumption,
the amplifier causes distortion in virtue of the behaviours of its constituent
transistors. In sum, neither PC nor PCD can deliver a sound method for causal-
or-constitutive inference, as they both tend to erroneously eliminate causal or
constitutive adjacencies.445
We take the above arguments to undermine Gebharter’s proposed use of
BN algorithms for constitutive discovery, and in particular, to show that im-
plicitly defining constitution as a form deterministic causation is not a promis-
ing way of bringing Bayesian methods to bear on the task of constitutional dis-
covery. An alternative approach is required, which rejects the basic assump-450
tion that constitution is formally analogous to causation, such that probabil-
ity distributions over variable sets including phenomena and their constituents
cannot be interpreted in the light of the BN axioms for causation, and con-
sequently, BN causal discovery methods cannot be applied to such variable
sets.455
9This case should be distinguished from the one where epiphenomenalism* simply cannot
be read off the graph, because the graph features adjacencies A–S and B–S as well as G–S,
such that it remains undecided which dependence is “productive” and which is “unproductive”
(cf. fn. 4). Here, PCD eliminates the A–S and B–S adjacencies, which would falsify the
epiphenomenalist* assumption.
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4 AN ALTERNATIVE
Epiphenomenalism is not a very popular view. Actually, in the philosophy
of the special sciences, it is common to assume that phenomena are causally
identified (Fodor, 1974; Kim, 1999; Fazekas and Kerte´sz, 2011). Here are
two examples from (Kim, 1999). Being in pain is “being in some state (or460
instantiating some property) caused by tissue damage and causing winces and
groans” (13). Being a gene is, roughly, “the property of having some prop-
erty (or being a mechanism) that performs a certain causal function, namely
that of transmitting phenotypic characteristics from parents to offsprings” (10).
Causally identified phenomena abound also in the scientific literature. To take465
a textbook example, cancer is, roughly, that condition initiated by exposure to
DNA-damaging factors and leading to unregulated cell growth (cf. King, 2006,
1, 24). Or, to come back to our guiding examples, amplification and action po-
tential are role fillers in a web of other phenomena (e.g., voltage input and
signal distortion in the former case, binding and release of neurotransmitters470
in the latter case).
Identifying the causal role of a target phenomenon with respect to other
phenomena explains (ætiologically) why a given system displays that phe-
nomenon (rather than some other phenomenon) on a particular occasion. How-
ever, it does not explain why the phenomenon has its characteristic role in475
that system. This, we take it, is the job of a mechanistic explanation. In a
mechanistic explanation, the whole system (e.g., the amplifier, the neuron) in-
stantiating the phenomenon is decomposed into its spatiotemporal parts (e.g.,
transistors and other elements of the circuitry, ion channels in the neuron’s
membrane) in order to identify the subset of parts, whose activities are con-480
stitutively responsible for the target phenomenon (e.g., amplification, action
potential). What are, then, those parts? In a nutshell, our proposal is that they
are all and only those parts, whose causal roles account for why the whole
has its characteristic causal role. In this section, we formally spell out this
intuition by offering a definition of constitution, which solves the problems485
incurred by Gebharter’s proposal in a simple and elegant way.
Our proposal relativizes the notion of constitution to causally-identifiable
phenomena. In particular, our proposal rejects Gebharter’s epiphenomenalist*
assumption, which is not assumed to follow from the causal interpretation of
probability distributions over variable sets including phenomena as well as490
their constituents. Rather, we take at face-value the aforementioned talk of
causally-identified phenomena and assume the falsity of epiphenomenalism*:
at least some phenomena have causes and effects. Our proposal analyses the
notion of constitution as relevant to such phenomena, which—we take it—
are widespread in the macro-level domains of investigation where mechanistic495
explanations are appropriate.
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Figure 7: Causal roles (a) of G over V′ ∖PG and (b) of A and B over V′ ∖ {G}.
Implementing the above intuition requires—first—to identify the causal
role of the phenomenon and the causal roles of its parts and—second—to
identify those parts, whose causal roles account for the phenomenon’s causal
role. To represent causal roles, we use the formalism of causal BNs, suitably500
relativized to specific variables. In this context, and only in this context, we
assume CMC and Faithfulness. More precisely, we do not require CMC or
Faithfulness to hold in variable sets comprising both the phenomenon and its
parts, such that the resulting BN is not causally interpretable, but only in sub-
sets including one but not the other. That is, contrary to Gebharter (2017b), we505
exclusively adopt CMC and Faithfulness for their traditional purpose, namely
causal inference. For us, the notion of causal roles is more basic than the no-
tion of constitution. The latter is defined in terms of the former, but not vice
versa.
Throughout our ensuing discussion we use the following definitions and510
make the following assumptions. V1 denotes a (causally-identifiable) phe-
nomenon of interest. In1 ∪Out1 denotes the set of inputs and outputs that
identify its characteristic causal role, by which we shall mean that the causal
relations between the elements of In1 ∪Out1 and V1 are the characteristic
causal role of V1. Since the notion of causal role presupposes the existence of515
at least one cause and one effect, we assume that In1≠∅ and Out1≠∅.
Next, P1 denotes the set of all and only the spatiotemporal parts of V1 in a
variable set V containing V1, meaning that for all Vi in P1, the spatiotempo-
ral region occupied by an instance of V1 contains the spatiotemporal regions
occupied by the instances of Vi. We assume that no other variable besides V1520
has parts in V—which entails that P1 is free of mereological relations.
Finally, the probability distributions in V ∖ {V1} and V ∖P1 are causally
interpretable. Let Anc(Vi) and Des(Vi) denote the sets of, respectively, an-
cestors and descendants of Vi. Then, in the (true) graph over V ∖P1, it holds
that In1 ⊆ Anc(V1) and Out1 ⊆ Des(V1). By contrast, the probability dis-525
tribution over V is not causally interpretable. Hence, CMC and Faithfulness
are assumed to hold in V ∖ {V1} and V ∖P1 but not in V.
To illustrate the first step of our analysis, which is concerned with identi-
fying the causal roles of phenomena and their parts, one may again consider
the amplifier example. The characteristic causal role of the phenomenon G,530
which consists of its causal relations to its characteristic cause, voltage inputI, and effect, signal distortion S, may be identified in a variable set that does
not include any of the amplifier’s parts (Figure 7a). Similarly, the causal roles
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Figure 8: Causal roles (a) of G overV′′′∖PG and (b) ofA, B, andH overV′′′∖{G}.
of G’s parts A and B relative to I and S may be identified in a variable set
that replaces G with its parts (Figure 7b). Notice that the first step presupposes535
knowledge of parthood relations but not of constitutive relations.
It should also be emphasized that this first step does not presuppose that
BN algorithms can always unambiguously single out the (true) graph rela-
tive to which causal roles are identified. For instance, they will not single
out the DAGs in Figure 7, and thus uncover the directed dependencies that540
make up the causal roles of G in V′ ∖ PG and of A and B in V′ ∖ {G}
(due to the absence of unshielded colliders into G and A). What we mean
here is that—conceptually—causal roles may be represented by a BN describ-
ing the true causal structure over a variable set, irrespective of whether—
methodologically—the discovery of that true structure is possible in that vari-545
able set, or some larger set is necessary (including, say, a number of unshielded
colliders, whose existence we take to be guaranteed by the complexity of the
world).
The second step of the analysis consists in rendering formally precise the
intuition anticipated in §1: constitution is a relation among behaviours, such550
that the phenomenon’s causal role is accounted for by its constituents’ causal
roles. Our proposal explicates this intuition as follows: all and only the parts
of V1 on directed paths from In1 to Out1 in variable sets suitable for causal
modelling account for V1’s causal role, and are thereby constituents of V1.
More precisely, relative to a given variable setV, V1’s causal role with respect555
to In1 ∪Out1 in V ∖ P1 is accounted for by those of V1’s parts that lie on
directed paths from In1 to Out1 in V ∖ {V1}. All and only those parts are
constituents of V1 in V.
Illustrated with reference to our amplifier example, G’s causal role in V′ ∖
PG is accounted for by A’s and B’s causal roles with respect to InG = {I}560
and OutG = {S} in V′ ∖ {G}, because A and B are on a directed path from
from I to S in V′ ∖ {G}. Thus, A and B are the constituents of G in V′.
By contrast, not all parts are constituents, as may be illustrated by reference
to Figure 8. Consider the variable set V′′′ = V′ ∪ {H}, which differs from
V′ only in that it contains a variable H, which denotes the temperature—565
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measured by a thermometer placed inside the amplifier—of the two transistors,
such thatA and B causeH inV′′′∖{G}. H is what Craver would call a “sterile
effect” (Craver, 2007, 143), that is, an effect of constituents that is not itself
a constituent. Intuitively, A and B are relevant to G’s causal role, because A
and B are on a directed path from I to S; by contrast,H is irrelevant, because570
it is not on a directed path from I to S .
Together, the above considerations yield the following, causal-role based
(CR) definition of constitution:
(CR) Let V1’s causal role be identified by In1 ∪Out1, where In1 ≠ ∅ and
Out1 ≠ ∅. Let the (true) causal graph in V ∖ P1 be such that In1 ⊆575
Anc(V1) and Out1 ⊆ Des(V1), where V1 is the only variable in V
with parts in V, and P1 is the set of spatiotemporal parts of V1 in V.
Then, Vi constitutes V1 if, and only if:
(i) Vi ∈ P1; and
(ii) in the (true) causal graph over V ∖ {V1}, Vi ∈Des(In1) and Vi ∈580
Anc(Out1).
Less formally, for a part Vi of a phenomenon V1—whose characteristic causal
role is identified by the causal structure over some set V ∖P1—to constituteV1, it is necessary and sufficient that Vi is a part of V1, and a descendant of
In1 and an ancestor of Out1 in the causal structure over V ∖ {V1}—that is,585
that Vi is a part of V1 on a directed path from In1 to Out1.
So, for instance, A (resp. B) constitutes G, because there exists a variable
setV′, which may be partitioned into two subsetsV′∖PG andV′∖{G}, such
that the structures over those subsets contain, respectively, a path I Ð→ G Ð→S, and a path I Ð→ A Ð→ S (resp. I Ð→ B Ð→ S). It is easy to verify590
that the definition applies also to the action potential example. In particular,
any element on the causal path X1 Ð→ . . . Ð→ Xn is a constituent, because
there exist variable sets V′′′′ = {O,P,E ,X1}, V′′′′′ = {O,P,E ,X2}, etc. that
satisfy CR, in the sense that the required directed paths exist in the structures
over V′′′′ ∖PP , V′′′′ ∖ {P}, V′′′′′ ∖PP , V′′′′′ ∖ {P}, etc.595
To reiterate, not always are the correct graphs over the subsets V ∖ P1
and V ∖ {V1} unambiguously singled out by BN algorithms (because certain
unshielded colliders may be missing from V). To that end, expansions of V
may be necessary (containing the needed unshielded colliders). That, however,
is a practical matter. Our proposal does not hinge on it: what CR requires is600
that directed paths exist in the true structures over V ∖P1 and V ∖ {V1}. At
the same time, relative to a variable setV∖P1, where a directed path from In1
to Out1 via V1 exists in the causal BN inferred by BN algorithms (thanks to
the existence of suitable colliders in V ∖P1), the required directed path from
In1 to Out1 via Vi will also exist in the causal BN over V ∖ {V1} (thanks to605
the existence of corresponding colliders in V ∖ {V1}).
18 LORENZO CASINI AND MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER
Also, albeit CR relativizes the notion of constitution to a variable set V,
given the existence of a suitableV, constitutive dependencies remain invariant
across expansions of that V including, say, further parts or further causes and
effects of the phenomenon. For instance, adding the behaviours of other ion610
channels to V′′′′, such as T1 and T2, doesn’t turn X1 into a non-constituent—
irrespective of whether X1 is unnecessary to screen off P fromO and E , givenT1 and T2.
Finally, whether a variable set V includes an “exhaustive set” of con-
stituents of a phenomenon—which behave like a complete set of common615
causes that screen off the phenomenon from its non-constituents—is irrele-
vant to whether any one of them counts as a constituent. For instance, by
assumption, in the amplifier’s case A and B exhaustively account for G. In
V′, both A and B are constituents of G and arguably form an exhaustive set
of constituents. However, were B removed from V′, A would still count as620
a constituent by the light of CR, even though it does not suffice to screen offG from I and S in V′. The same point applies to cases where the notion of
an exhaustive set is more elusive, such as the action potential case, where T1
and T2 suffice to screen off P fromO and E in V′′, but intuitively do not form
an exhaustive set of constituents. According to CR, T1 and T2 count as con-625
stituents of P just as much as their ancestors on the path X1 Ð→ . . .Ð→ Xn.
Our theory lends itself to a straightforward implementation. The search
target of a Bayesian discovery procedure inspired by our proposal amounts to
a set C1 of constituents in the subset P1 of spatiotemporal parts of a target
phenomenon V1, such thatC1 explains V1’s causal role. To find a suitableC1,630
one should first assign variables, whose values stand in mereological relations,
to two distinct variable subsets. In particular, the subset including V1 should
not include its parts in P1 and vice versa. Next, one should verify that the
variables In1 and Out1 that identify the characteristic causal role of V1 are
among, respectively, its ancestors and its descendants in V ∖P1. Finally, one635
should single out the parts that lie on directed paths from In1 to Out1 in
V ∖ {V1}. All and only such variables belong to C1, relative to V.
By rejecting the basic assumption that constitution is (analogous to) a form
of causation, our proposal provides a simple and elegant solution to the two
problems incurred by Gebharter’s approach. Since we do not assume Faith-640
fulness over V, our proposal is not subject to the problem that not all causal
dependencies are identified. In particular, the identification of causal depen-
dencies between the mechanism and its environment is guaranteed by the re-
striction of BN causal discovery methods to suitable subsets of V. Nor is
our proposal subject to the problem that constituents are mistaken for non-645
constituents when they are unnecessary to determine the phenomenon, and
thus to screen it off from its non-constituents. What matters to constitution is
whether, relative to a suitable subset of V, a variable that is a spatiotemporal
part of the phenomenon lies on a directed path from its causes to its effects.
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Finally, we should emphasize that both our proposal and Gebharter’s650
(2017b) proposal assume background knowledge of spatiotemporal parthood
relations between values of variables. This parthood assumption is customarily
made by all proposals on how to define or discover constitution in the literature
(Craver, 2007; Harbecke, 2010; Couch, 2011; Gebharter, 2017b; Baumgartner
and Casini, 2017; Krickel, 2018). Gebharter uses the assumption to choose655
variable sets with two levels of variables only; we use it to select variable sets,
which may be partitioned into two subsets with variables on one level only.
The sort of knowledge required to satisfy such assumptions is the same. With-
out doubt, ensuring that the parthood assumption is satisfied involves impor-
tant epistemic as well as conceptual challenges, which make the assumption660
particularly “costly”. What we aimed to demonstrate in this paper, though, is
that anyone who is attracted by Gebharter’s attempt to bring Bayesian tools to
bear on the problem of constitutional discovery, should prefer our proposal to
his, on the ground that it avoids its shortcomings at no additional cost. More-
over, insofar as any currently available theory of constitution takes parthood665
for granted, this point may be generalized. If one is attracted by any theory of
constitution, one should be attracted by our proposal, or at least consider it a
serious contender.
5 CONCLUSION
Gebharter has recently suggested that Bayesian causal discovery tools may670
be fruitfully brought to bear on the problem of constitutional discovery. He
proposes that they be used to infer to causal as well as constitutive dependen-
cies in one go, in spite of the widespread view that causation and constitution
are different kinds of relation. The first part of this paper argued that Geb-
harter’s proposal incurs violations of one standard assumption of BN causal675
discovery algorithms, viz. Faithfulness, leading to mistakes in causal or con-
stitutive inference. It leads to mistakes in causal inference because, relative
to certain mechanistic structures, it infers that the mechanism is isolated from
its environment. And it leads to mistakes in constitutive inference because,
relative to other mechanistic structures, it infers that some parts are not con-680
stituents. From this, we concluded that Gebharter’s starting point, viz. using
the assumptions of the Bayesian network formalism to implicitly define con-
stitution as a form of direct deterministic causation, is not a promising way
of bringing Bayesian networks methods to bear on the task of constitutional
discovery.685
As an alternative, the second part of the paper proposed to exploit the intu-
ition that, in a mechanistic explanation, the causal role of a target phenomenon
is explained in terms of the more fundamental causal roles of some of the sys-
tem’s parts. Our analysis cashed out this general intuition in the framework
of Bayesian networks. More precisely, a constituent is the behaviour of a part690
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on a directed path from the causes to the effect that identify the characteristic
causal role of the phenomenon. By not assuming Faithfulness (or any of the
other BN assumptions for causation) to hold of variable sets including both
phenomena and their parts, our proposal avoids in a simple and elegant way
the problems of Gebharter’s proposal and, as a result, provides a theoretically695
sound foundation to the application of BN methods to constitutional discovery.
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